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Abstract.
In studying how lay people evaluate arguments, psychologists have typically focused on
logical form and content. This emphasis has masked an important yet underappreciated
aspect of every day argument evaluation: social cues to argument strength. Here, we
focus on the ways in which observers evaluate arguments by the reaction they evoke in
an audience. This type of evaluation is likely to occur either when people are not privy to
the content of the arguments or when they are not expert enough to appropriately evaluate
it. Four experiments explore cues that participants might take into account in evaluating
arguments from the reaction of the audience. They demonstrate that participants can use
audience motivation, expertise and size as clues to argument quality. By contrast, we find
no evidence that participants take audience diversity into account.
Keywords: argument evaluation, argumentation, audience, social cues.

Arguments can be evaluated in several ways. Typically, their form and content is the
subject of scrutiny. Their logical validity can be assessed, and this has been the topic of
logic. Their content also matters: minimally, if the premises are known to be false, the
argument loses its appeal. Straddling form and content, argumentation schemes—appeal
to authority, argument from example, etc.—can be evaluated by a variety of means, such
as their fit with what is deemed to be the proper scheme in each case (e.g. Walton, Reed,
& Macagno, 2008). There is however another kind of way to evaluate arguments: by
gauging the reaction of their audience. An argument that has convinced its audience is,
ceteris paribus, more likely to have been sound than an unsuccessful one. This criterion
is hardly new: universal acceptance is for Kant the strongest grounds to accept an
argument: “If something is valid for anybody in possession of his reason, then its grounds
are objective and sufficient” (Kant, 1999 cited in Popper, 2002, p.22).
Most attention in experimental psychology has focused on the first way to
evaluate arguments. The psychology of reasoning has mostly focused on testing people’s
ability to detect the logical validity of arguments, or to follow other normative guidelines
such as Bayes’ rule (Evans, 2002; Hahn & Oaksford, 2007). Studies of persuasion and
attitude change have evaluated the impact of numerous factors, including the strength of
different arguments (Petty & Wegener, 1998). By contrast, little attention has been
devoted to the evaluation of arguments by way of the reaction of their intended audience.
Yet we are often unable to evaluate the form or content of arguments. In some cases, we
are simply not privy to the arguments and the reaction of the audience is the only clue we
have. In other cases the arguments are available, but we don’t have the required expertise.
Lack of expertise does not entail a very technical or abstruse topic, but merely lack of

knowledge, as when the argument bears on a vague acquaintance. And even if we can
rely on the form and content of the argument, gauging the audience reaction could
provide complementary clues to its strength.
In this article, we provide a first exploration of the different ways in which
audience responses may be considered in evaluating an argument.
How might people evaluate arguments based on the reaction of the audience?
Arguments are always addressed at someone, namely the recipient of the
argument, and that recipient may be an individual or a group. However, the reach of an
argument will frequently also extend beyond the intended recipient, affecting other
individuals not directly addressed by the proponent. All of those people reached by an
argument may, in a sense, be considered to be the ‘audience’. Argumentation theorists
have even considered hypothetical audiences, such as Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s
idea of the universal audience, a construct invoked in seeking to provide a rational
foundation for rhetoric: “Argumentation addressed at a universal audience must convince
the reader that the reasons adduced are of a compelling character, that they are selfevident, and possess an absolute and timeless validity, independent of local or historical
contingencies” (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1958, p.32).
Deciding which audience matters in assessing an argument bears on the normative
question: “what is a good argument?” Indeed, this is what Kant does in the citation
above: he defines a good argument by reference to its effect on an audience: an argument
is deemed to be good if it convinces an extremely encompassing audience comprising
“anybody in possession of his reason.” By contrast with this Kantian view, a pragmatic

view would focus purely on the intended recipient of the argument and her or his
reaction. On this view, the only goal of reasoning is to convince “the ensemble of those
whom the speaker wishes to influence by his argumentation” (Perelman & OlbrechtsTyteca, 1958, p.19). Consequently, an argument is deemed to have been good as long as
this intended audience is convinced. The assent or dissent of any other individual, or
group of individuals is irrelevant.
The reaction of the audience can also be used to determine what is a good
argument from an evolutionary perspective. The argumentative theory of reasoning posits
that reasoning evolved to convince others, and to only be convinced when appropriate
(Mercier & Sperber, 2011). In this evolutionary view, the goal of argument production is
to convince the intended audience, as in the pragmatic view. However, it also specifies
that reasoning has to be efficient in its normal conditions, “the conditions to which the
device that performs the proper function is biologically adapted” (Millikan, 1987, p.34).
We surmise that the normal conditions for reasoning to produce arguments are as
follows: a dialogue with an audience that shares the arguer’s reasoning abilities, as well
as most of her beliefs, but who disagrees about one point. A good argument is one that
convinces such an audience. It is therefore less exigent than the Kantian view (assent
does not have to be universal), but more exigent than the pragmatic view (assent has to be
gained from someone in a good position to evaluate the argument).
The Kantian, pragmatic and evolutionary views, however, do not aim at
describing how people actually take the audience’s reaction into account when evaluating
an argument. This is apparent from the counter-intuitive predictions they make. Any

synthetic argument1 is very likely to be rejected at some point, and would therefore be
deemed not to be a good argument following a strict Kantian view, leaving very few good
arguments. If the Kantian view is overly strict, treating as deficient arguments that many
would say are good, the pragmatic view suffers from the opposite flaw: it accepts too
many arguments—such as arguments accepted by an incompetent audience for instance.
The evolutionary view is less immediately counter-intuitive, but it is still likely to be
overly inclusive in its definition of a good argument, accepting for instance historical
arguments that have long been refuted.
While these different views address an interesting philosophical question about
what, in an abstract sense, makes an argument ‘good’, they are of little help to someone
seeking to gauge the extent to which they should be convinced by a particular argument,
given the reaction of its audience. For any individual trying to evaluate a specific
argument from the audience’s reaction, the question is: what cues can be gathered that
will help me decide whether I should accept the conclusion? From an argumentationtheoretic perspective, such cues may be viewed either from a scheme-based approach
(see for example, Hoeken, Timmers, & Schellens, current issue), or from a probabilistic
perspective (see Harris, Hsu & Madsen, in press).
Our focus in this paper is simply on exploring whether or not people actually
make use of a number of intuitively plausible clues. The first clue is the reaction of the
intended audience, but the reactions of other people beyond the intended audience can
also be informative. Moreover, the reactions of both the recipients and of potential third
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
1

A synthetic argument relies on propositions that are not true purely by virtue of the terms they
contain, by opposition with analytic propositions such as “all squares have four sides.”

parties should, intuitively, be modulated by how carefully they evaluated the argument. If
they were too stubborn or too distracted to evaluate the argument, rejection is not
diagnostic. Likewise, if they already agreed with the arguer, and were therefore unlikely
to cast a critical eye on her arguments, acceptance is not diagnostic of argument strength.
In the context of a motivated audience other factors can lead to more fine-grained
distinctions. The first is the relative expertise of the proponent, the recipient, and
potential third parties. If the arguer is the expert, her ability to convince less expert
people may be less diagnostic of how good her arguments are. If there is a disagreement
within the audience, or between the audience and third parties, the reaction of the most
expert group should take precedence (on expertise and arguments from authority see also,
Hoeken et al., current issue; Harris et al., current issue; van Eemeren, Garssen, &
Meuffels, current issue). Audience diversity could also be a valuable cue. The more
diverse the audience, the more diagnostic its acceptance of an argument should be.
Audience size should also matter: the more people accept an argument, the more likely it
is that the argument is sound. It should be noted, however, that for size to matter some
degree of diversity must exist: being able to convince several people who have exactly
the same knowledge and ability is not more diagnostic than convincing one of them.
Finally, we might expect in reasoners a general bias towards caution. In general, the
dangers of accepting too much information are larger than that of rejecting too much
(Mercier, in press), and so people should not easily say that an argument is good when
they are in doubt.
In the experiments below, we provide an exploration of these cues in situations
where they are the sole evidence available to participants for argument evaluation.

Although this situation reflects some real life settings, in most cases people would use
social cues—the audience reaction—in conjunction with some evaluation of the content
of the argument. We leave open the question of how this integration is made, and what
weight social cues receive in different contexts.

Overview of the experiments
In the following experiments, participants had to evaluate arguments purely on the
basis of the reaction of audiences and third parties. Different characteristics of the arguer,
the audience and third parties were varied in order to test which characteristics have an
impact on argument evaluation. All experiments were carried out online using a similar
template. Accordingly, the characteristics of the participants as well as the outline of the
procedures are provided here for all experiments.
Participants
All participants were recruited through the Amazon Mechanical Turk website.
They were recruited using the same procedure, in close temporal proximity and so will be
treated as a single group (N = 491). They were paid $0.1 for their participation, a normal
rate for this type of task in Mechanical Turk. All participants had to be in the US at the
time of the experiment. A mechanism stops most participants from taking part in the
same experiment, or in several experiments of the same study, several times. However, it
is fallible, so the IP addresses of all the participants were checked. Five results were
deleted because the same IP had already been used in a previous experiment of the study.

The average participant age was M = 34.1, SD = 12.4. Sixty-three percent of the
participants were female. Finally, 85% of participants had at least some college
education. Several published studies already rely on this sample (e.g. DeScioli &
Kurzban, 2009), and specifically designed experiments have established its reliability
(Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011; Paolacci, Chandler, & Ipeirotis, 2010).
Procedure
Participants registered on the Amazon Mechanical Turk Website. They were then
redirected to the website of the experiment itself, programmed using the Qualtrics
software. They went through the questions one by one, without possibility of going back,
and provided some demographic information at the end of the experiment.
Experiment 1: Motivation
The goal of Experiment 1 is to test the impact of audience motivation on the
assessment of arguments. In the High Motivation condition the recipient accepts the
argument after previously disagreeing with the proponent and should therefore have been
motivated to evaluate the argument. In the Low Motivation condition the recipient
accepts the argument after previously agreeing with the proponent and should therefore
not have been motivated to evaluate the argument very thoroughly. In the Mixed
Motivation condition the recipient is not convinced by the argument, but she has paid no
attention to the argument; a third party pays attention and accepts the argument. If
audience response is viewed as a cue that varies in diagnosticity as a function of audience
characteristics, then the argument should be seen to be strong only where a motivated
audience finds it acceptable, that is in the High and Mixed Motivation conditions.

Design
The three conditions were varied between participants.
Materials
In the High Motivation condition, participants read the following text:
John and Michael are talking about something, and they realize they have a
different opinion. John makes an argument supporting his opinion, and Michael
finds it convincing.
In the Low Motivation condition, the text was:
John and Michael are talking about something, and they realize they have the
same opinion. John makes an argument supporting this opinion, and Michael
finds it convincing.
In the Mixed Motivation condition, the text was:
John and Michael disagree about something. John makes an argument but
Michael does not pay any attention to the argument and, as a result, is not
convinced by it. Paul, who overhears the conversation, is convinced by the
argument.
After reading the text, participants answered the following question: “Do you think that
John's argument is:” which they could answer by “Likely to be good,” “Likely to be
poor,” or “I cannot tell.”

Results and discussion
The results are presented in Table 1. They indicate that participants consider
audience responses to be informative about argument quality. The Low Motivation
condition was significantly different from both other conditions (χ2, ps < .0001), with
more “I cannot tell” and less “Likely to be good” answers. This means that in evaluating
audience responses participants take audience characteristics that are likely to influence
depth of processing into account, whether they are characteristics of the recipient or a
third party.
Likely to be good

Likely to be poor

I cannot tell

High Motivation (N=48)

96%

2%

2%

Low Motivation (N=45)

36%

11%

53%

Mixed Motivation (N=94)

72%

6%

21%

Table 1: Evaluation of arguments by condition in Experiment 1.
Experiment 2: Expertise
The goal of Experiment 2 is to evaluate the impact of expertise on the evaluation
of arguments. In all conditions, the proponent produced an argument that convinced the
recipient but failed to convince a third party. The expertise of the three characters was
varied, allowing examination of the way expertise and agreement/disagreement combine.

Intuitively, one might expect a counterargument by an expert to outweigh
agreement by a novice, irrespective of the expertise of the arguer. An expert convincing
another expert should be a good clue that the argument is good, even if a novice
disagrees, since the novice is more likely to be mistaken. When the level of expertise of
the audience and the third parties are similar, it should be harder to tell who is right, and
therefore it is more cautious to remain undecided.
Design
The design is a partial 2*2*2, with the first variable being Arguer expertise
(Novice or Expert), the second Audience expertise (Novice or Expert) and the third Third
Party expertise (Novice or Expert). Three conditions were not conducted. Expert-ExpertExpert did not add anything to Novice-Novice-Novice since it is the relative level of
expertise that matters. Novice-Expert-Novice and Novice-Expert-Expert were not
conducted because it was not felicitous to have a novice convince an expert. The
conditions formed two groups that were conducted between participants.
Materials
We used the following template (here the Expert-Novice-Expert) for all but one of
the variants:
A physicist and a layman disagree about a problem in physics. The physicist
makes an argument and convinces the layman to change his mind. Another
physicist, who overhears the conversation, thinks of counterarguments and is not
convinced.

The roles of the laymen and physicists were permutated to create the different conditions.
The only exception was the case of identical level of expertise for which we did not
specify the degree of expertise in order to have a natural middle ground between novices
and experts:
John and Michael disagree about something. John makes an argument and
convinces Michael to change his mind. Paul, who overhears the conversation,
thinks of counterarguments and is not convinced.
The question asked was similar to that of Experiment 1: “Do you think that [proponent]’s
argument is:” “Likely to be good,” “Likely to be poor,” or “I cannot tell.”
Results and discussion
The results are laid out in Table 2. We can distinguish three cases. The first is that
of equal expertise among all three protagonists, here represented by the Novice-NoviceNovice condition. When two people with equal expertise disagree on their evaluation of
an argument, it makes intuitive sense to withhold judgment, which is what a majority of
participants did. This condition differs significantly from all the others (four χ2 with df =
2, ps < .05). The second case is when the third party, who rejects the argument, has more
expertise than the recipient who accepts it—here the Expert-Novice-Expert and NoviceNovice-Expert conditions. This is a good indication that the argument may be poor, and
indeed a majority of participants in these two conditions gave the “Likely to be poor”
answer. These two conditions (Expert-Novice-Expert and Novice-Novice-Expert) are not
significantly different from one another but differ from the other three conditions (six χ2
with df = 2, ps < .001). Finally, the third case involves a third party who rejects an

argument from a more expert proponent, an argument accepted by the recipient (here
Expert-Expert-Novice and Expert-Novice-Novice). A majority of participants (in the
Expert-Expert-Novice condition) and a plurality of participants (in the Expert-NoviceNovice) answered that the argument was “Likely to be good.” These two conditions
differ from the other three (six χ2 with df = 2, ps < .001). It is noteworthy, however, that
when the protagonist who agreed with the proponent was only as expert as the one who
disagreed (Expert-Novice-Novice), equally many participants answered “I cannot tell”
and “Likely to be good,” reflective a more cautious stance overall.
Arguer

Audience

Third party

Likely to be

Likely to be

expertise

expertise

expertise

good

poor

Expert (N=94)

Expert

Novice

53%

22%

25%

Expert (N=91)

Novice

Expert

15%

53%

32%

Expert (N=94)

Novice

Novice

37%

25%

37%

Novice (N=91)

Novice

Expert

13%

63%

24%

Novice (N=94)

Novice

Novice

18%

30%

52%

Table 2: Evaluation of arguments by condition in Experiment 2.
Experiment 3: Diversity

I cannot tell

Experiment 3 aims at evaluating the impact of audience diversity on argument
evaluation. If an audience accepts an argument, the more diverse the audience is, the
more it constitutes a clue that the argument is good.
Design
This experiment had a between participants design with two conditions: Diversity
High and Diversity Low.
Materials
In the Diversity High condition, participants read the following text:
Rob, a scientist, has a new idea to improve the way science is conducted. He
presents this idea and makes an argument for it in front of an audience of twenty
scientists—physicists, biologists, chemists, linguists, psychologists. After the
argument nearly all of them are convinced that Rob’s idea is right.
In the Diversity Low condition, “scientists—physicists, biologists, chemists, linguists,
psychologists” was replaced by “physicists.” People were then asked a single question:
“Do you think that Rob’s argument is,” which they could answer on a scale from 1 to 7 (1
Bad, 2 Average, 3 Good, 4 Very good, 5 Powerful, 6 Very powerful, 7 Incredibly
powerful) or they could answer “I cannot tell.” The scale was used to obtain a finer
grained assessment of participants’ evaluations, and it was skewed towards positive
evaluation in order to avoid ceiling effects.
Results and discussion

First, there was no significant difference in the number of ‘I cannot tell’ answers
across conditions (Fisher exact test, ns). Looking only at the other answers, the answers
in both conditions averaged around 6 (very powerful): Diversity High, M = 5.9, SD =
1.00; Diversity Low, M = 6.0, SD = 0.82 (t(83) = 0.61, p = .35). It seems as if participants
do not take diversity into account when evaluating arguments. Yet this result could stem
from a ceiling effect, with most participants being reluctant to describe an argument as
‘Incredibly powerful’. Another possible confound is that participants could have judged
the physicists to be the most competent group, and their competence would have offset
the lack of diversity.
Experiment 4: Diversity, motivation and audience size
Experiment 4 is an attempt at correcting the ceiling effect that render the
interpretation of the results from Experiment 3 difficult, as well as the potential confound
linked to competence. To do so, it introduces a Low Motivation condition in which the
audience agrees with the arguer to start with. As a result, the argument should be deemed
to be less good overall, keeping the competence of audience members neutral. It also
introduces a new variable, audience size, which could be used as a clue by participants to
evaluate arguments.
Design
The design was a 2*2*2. The first two factors were Diversity (High or Low),
Motivation (High or Low), both varied between participants, and the third Audience Size
(Large or Small), varied within participants.

Materials
Participants read variants on the following text (here the Audience Size LargeDiversity High-Motivation High condition):
Rob, an Australian politician, makes an argument in front of an audience of a
hundred people. They are members of several political parties, all of which
oppose Rob’s position. After the argument nearly all of them are convinced that
Rob is right.
In the Audience Size Small conditions, the audience comprised 10 people. In the
Diversity Low condition, “They are members of several political parties” was replaced
with “They are members of the same political party.” Finally, in the Motivation Low
condition, “all of which oppose Rob’s position” was replaced by “all of which agree with
Rob’s position.” Question format was the same as Experiment 3.
Results and discussion
Experiment 4 is consistent with the results of Experiment 1: significantly more
participants answered ‘I cannot tell’ in the Motivation Low (26%) than in the Motivation
High (4%) condition (Fisher exact test, df = 1, p < .001). Regarding the ‘I cannot tell’
answer, no other variation by condition or interaction was significant. That only a
minority of participants chose to answer ‘I cannot tell’ in this experiment, as opposed to a
majority in Experiment 1, can be explained by the increased difficulty of the task facing
the arguer, as he has to convince a much larger audience.

If we look only at the results excluding the ‘I cannot tell’ answers (Table 3 and
Figure 1), we observe two main effects. The first is the effect of motivation: participants
judged the argument to be less good when the motivation of the audience was low (t(157)
= 4.6, p < .001). This effect complements the increase in ‘I cannot tell’ answers, and
confirms that audience motivation is an important factor for argument evaluation. The
second significant main effect is that of size: participants judged the argument that
convinced a larger audience to be better (t(157) = 2.7, p < .01). Diversity again did not
give rise to a main effect (t(157) = 0.6, p = .53). It failed to interact with motivation (2way ANOVA, F(1,158) < 1) and it also failed to interact with group size (2-way
ANOVA, F(1,158) = 3.7, p = .056). These results confirm those of Experiment 3 that
participants fail to take audience diversity into account when gauging the value of
arguments. The ceiling effect that rendered the interpretation of Experiment 3 difficult
was removed here, as even in the Motivation Low condition, in which the average
argument rating was 4.7 out of 7, diversity had no effect on argument rating. It should be
noted however that the significant effect of size, as opposed to diversity, could be due to
the fact that size was manipulated within participants while diversity was manipulated
between participants. This may have made the size variable more salient to participants.
More experiments will be necessary to tease out the effects of size and diversity.
Motivation High

Motivation Low

Diversity

Diversity

Diversity

Diversity

High

Low

High

Low

Size Large

Size Small

6.23 (1.27)

6.14 (0.77)

5.71 (1.10)

4.64 (1.86)

(N=22)

(N=24)

(N=21)

(N=14)

5.79 (1.18)

5.95 (1.50)

3.88 (1.71)

4.32 (1.97)

(N=22)

(N=21)

(N=16)

(N=19)

Table 3: Mean evaluation of arguments by condition in Experiment 4, showing potential
interactions (SD in parentheses).

Argument	
  Strength	
  
7	
  
6.5	
  
6	
  
5.5	
  
5	
  
4.5	
  
4	
  

Figure 1: Evaluation of arguments by condition in Experiment 4, showing main effects.
Conclusion
The main way in which people evaluate arguments is through their form and
content. It is therefore natural that experimental psychology has dedicated most of its
efforts to understanding the processes that underlie such evaluation. But arguments can
also be evaluated by gauging the reaction of their audience. For instance if a motivated,

expert audience is swayed by an argument, it is a reasonably good clue that the argument
was a good one, and that maybe we should also accept its conclusion. The experiments
above show that people are able to take such clues into account.
Experiment 1 demonstrated that participants are sensitive to the motivation of the
audience: if the audience agrees with the arguer to start with, or if it does not pay
attention to the argument, its reaction is discounted. Experiment 2 showed that
participants take into account the relative expertise of the arguer, the audience, and third
parties. A majority of participants found the argument to be good only when a novice
found a counterargument to an argument that had convinced an expert. In all other cases
participants found the arguments to be poor or refused to judge them. This fits with the
idea that people are cautious: a reason to doubt that the argument is good—such as a
disagreement between two equally competent listeners—is enough to stop them from
accepting it. In Experiment 3, participants failed to take into account audience diversity
in their evaluation of arguments. Two potential confounds were ruled out in Experiment
4, which confirmed that diversity is not easily taken into account. This null effect does
not reflect lack of power for Experiment 4 replicated the effect of motivation observed in
Experiment 1 and demonstrated that participants can take audience size into account. It
should be noted, however, that if a modicum of diversity is necessary for audience size to
make a difference in argument evaluation, this result could mean that diversity is in fact
taken into account by participants, even if by a circuitous route.
The negative result regarding the role of diversity may be a promising avenue for
future research. Diversity has been shown to be a crucial determinant of collective
intelligence (Hong & Page, 2004). Through simulations, Hong and Page have shown that

diversity often trumps competence: as long as group members are minimally competent,
an increase in diversity brings more benefit to the problem solving potential of the group
than an increase in competence. The counterintuitiveness of this result may reflect a
general failure to appreciate the cognitive benefits of diversity, a failure that may also
explain the results of Experiments 3 and 4. But before drawing too bleak a conclusion
from our results, it should be pointed out that they clash with a large literature showing
that adults and even children routinely take diversity into account in a variety of tasks
(see, for instance, Hahn, Bailey, & Elvin, 2005; Osherson, Smith, Wilkie & Lopez, 1990;
Heit & Hahn, 2001). A possible explanation for our discrepant findings is that
participants may have inferred that when the audience was more diverse, the scope of the
arguments was wider, which would make the expertise of the various audience members
potentially less relevant to the evaluation of the argument.2 More experiments will have
to be conducted before we can conclude that participants really discount diversity when
they evaluate arguments from the reaction of the audience.
Whatever clues they take into account, people are often called to use audience
reaction in the evaluation of arguments. This article is a first step towards a better
understanding of the processes underlying this type of evaluation.
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